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We evaluate the impact of the Medicare HMO program and prescription drug coverage on
elderly mortality using data from 1993 to 2000. We specify a model of plan entry and benefit
choice and Medicare enrollee plan choice and health outcomes. We derive an estimator that is
consistent with endogenous plan selection by using the quasi-experimental variation caused by
peculiarities of the Medicare reimbursement system for HMOs. We find that, relative to traditional
Medicare, enrollment in an HMO without drug coverage increases mortality while enrollment in
an HMO with drug coverage has no significant impact. The economic value of the reduction in
mortality from drug coverage far outweighs the costs. HMOs, those without drug coverage in
particular, attract healthier enrollees than average.
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1. Introduction 
In the United States, the 1990s saw a dramatic rise of a relatively new 
organizational mechanism for financing and organizing health care: managed 
care. By the end of the decade the vast majority of individuals with private health 
insurance were enrolled in some form of managed care (Glied, 2000). By using 
utilization management, writing high-powered contracts with plan providers, and 
perhaps most importantly, exercising bargaining power over providers, managed 
care offers a potentially more efficient alternative to traditional indemnity health 
insurance.1 However, part of the reduction in costs from managed care may be 
due to a lower quality of care.  
The potential efficiency gains from managed care have influenced 
government policy. Starting in 1982, the Medicare administration offered 
managed care plans to its enrollees as a way to reduce expenditures in this 
gigantic government program. By 2000, 15% or over 6 million Medicare 
enrollees opted for a private health maintenance organization (HMO) instead of 
traditional Medicare insurance. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) had two intertwined legislative 
intents: moving Medicare further towards managed care and increasing access to 
drug coverage for the elderly. Drug coverage has become increasingly important 
because of the development of many useful drug therapies over the last 30 years 
(Lichtenberg, 2002a, b). The MMA has been criticized on several levels, 
including by researchers who believe that it may result in lower quality care and 
cause plans to design benefits to exploit adverse selection (see McAdams and 
Schwartz, 2006). More recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) of 2010 increases the subsidies for drug coverage for the elderly by 
reducing coverage gaps and finances the subsidies for private health coverage by 
reducing payments to Medicare managed care plans.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of Medicare HMOs on 
the quality of health care, using data from 1993 to 2000. We define quality using 
what is generally considered the most important outcome measure, mortality, in 
our case mortality for the elderly.2 Medicare HMOs may offer benefits that 
exceed the basic Medicare package. Generally the most valued additional benefit 
is drug coverage, and hence a related purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
impact of drug coverage, as provided by HMOs, on mortality. We specify a model 
of HMO entry, pricing, and benefit decisions and Medicare enrollee plan choices 
                                               
1 For instance, Cutler et al. (2000) find that the main effect of managed care is to lower prices paid 
to providers. 
2 There are many other measures of health outcomes including (but not limited to) morbidity, 
physical functioning status, psychosocial functioning and quality of life (Donabedian, 1985). We 
focus on mortality because it is unambiguously a measure of health outcomes, measurement error 
is modest, and it is readily measured with available data.  
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and health outcomes. We use the model to derive estimating equations and 
methods that are consistent with endogenous selection into HMOs and, in 
conjunction with the estimates, to provide evidence on the equilibrium provision 
of quality and the extent of adverse selection in this market and on the relative 
benefit to costs of the Medicare HMO program and Medicare drug coverage.  
We hope that our study will inform the policy debate on the impact of 
Medicare HMOs and drug coverage on health outcomes and, through that, 
provide more general evidence on the impact of managed care on the quality of 
health care. The literature on the impact of Medicare HMOs on mortality has not 
reached any consistent conclusions,3 nor has the overall literature on the effect of 
managed care penetration on health outcomes.4 A likely reason for the 
inconsistent findings may be an endogeneity problem, where people are likely to 
select into HMOs and drug coverage on the basis of their health status, and health 
status is not perfectly observed. A number of other studies that assess the impact 
of managed care penetration on different outcomes have attempted to control for 
this endogeneity problem with a variety of methods.5  
Our data provide us with a unique source of quasi-experimental variation 
that allows us to address the endogeneity problem in a manner that is consistent 
with our model. The quasi-experimental variation is based on peculiarities of the 
method by which the Medicare administration reimbursed HMOs for providing 
health care to its enrollees: until 1997, HMOs were reimbursed a fixed payment 
rate based on the mean realized per capita fee-for-service (FFS) expenditures in 
the county over a six-year period, from eight years prior to three years prior.6
Provided that unobserved shocks to health status in a county are sufficiently 
independent that there is no correlation between the shocks in a given year and for 
three years prior, the payment rate can be used to construct instruments.7 The 
unobserved shocks are more likely to be independent if we include sufficient 
observed measures of health status. Our observed measures are extensive; they 
                                               
3 While Maciejewski et al. (2001) and Riley et al. (1989, 1991) find that Medicare HMO enrollees 
have a lower probability of death than other Medicare enrollees, other studies find no significant 
difference between the groups for breast cancer, prostate cancer, end-stage renal dialysis, and 
acute myocardial infarction (see Lee-Feldstein et al., 2000, Roetzheim et al., 2000, Potosky et al., 
1999, Eggers et al., 2002, and Sada et al., 1998). 
4 A review by Miller and Luft (2002) reports that over the period 1997-2001, nine studies find that 
HMOs lead to lower mortality, twelve find that HMOs lead to higher mortality, and six find no 
difference. 
5 Baker and Brown (1999) use instruments formed from the size distribution of firms (without 
fixed effects), Cutler et al. (2000) use fixed effects, and Dranove et al. (2002) use fixed effects 
with long differences.  
6 As we detail below, the reimbursement scheme was different for the last three years of our 
sample, but the same basic idea for identification will apply. 
7 Chernew et al. (2008) used the same identification scheme to analyze the impact of Medicare 
managed care enrollment on Medicare FFS costs. 
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include a county fixed effect, the contemporaneous health status of younger 
people (as measured by mortality), detailed demographic data, and measures of 
supplemental health coverage (such as Medigap and Medicaid). We also provide 
evidence on the empirical validity of the independence assumption. 
As an example of the forces that will identify our parameters, suppose 
County A in 1993 has a Medicare patient who undergoes a costly and rare 
procedure for a potentially fatal condition, such as a heart transplant or a heart 
assist implant.8 This will substantially boost County A’s reimbursement rate in 
1996 relative to 1995, which will cause plans to enter and offer drug benefits and 
lower prices (see Town and Liu, 2003). This will, in turn, increase enrollment in 
HMOs that offer drug coverage, which may affect County A’s mortality rate in 
1996. If unobserved health shocks that cause mortality are not correlated between 
1993 and 1996, this will provide an appropriate and useful source of identification 
of the impact of managed care and drug coverage on mortality.  
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides a 
background on the institutional framework. Section 3 explains our model and 
inference. Section 4 details the data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Institutional background 
We focus on the Medicare program for the aged, which served 35 million of the 
41 million Medicare enrollees in 2003.9 This traditional FFS Medicare program 
consists of two parts. Part A covers hospital stays (with a small deductible) and 
catastrophic care. Part A enrollment is automatic. In addition, enrollees can (and 
most do) enroll in Part B for a premium ($43.80 per month in 1998). Part B 
covers physician services with a 20% coinsurance, lab and diagnostic tests, 
outpatient services with a 20% copayment, and mental health care with a 50% 
copayment. Medicare’s Part A and B programs do not cover long-term care, 
prescription drugs, most preventive care, dental care, or eye care.  
In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
which directed the Health Care Financing Administration, now called the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to contract with HMOs to provide a 
managed care option to Medicare enrollees. The Medicare HMO program has 
been given several names throughout its history and is currently called Medicare 
Advantage. During the 1997 to 2003 period, which much of our data span, the 
program was called Medicare+Choice (M+C), and hence we refer to the program 
                                               
8 In 2002 Medicare paid for 484 heart transplants and 562 heart assist implants. The cost of these 
procedures to Medicare often exceeds $370,000 and $240,000, respectively. A good portion of 
health care costs consist of such costly and rare procedures. 
9 The other 6 million Medicare beneficiaries are either disabled or End Stage Renal Dialysis 
eligible.  
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by this name. In counties with available M+C plans, Medicare beneficiaries can 
enroll in or withdraw from an M+C plan on a monthly basis. Beneficiaries who 
withdraw from an M+C plan are automatically enrolled in Medicare FFS Part A 
and have the option of enrolling in Medicare Part B.  
Each contracting HMO agrees to accept all Medicare enrollees residing in 
the county who enroll with it, and to provide and assume the risk for all Part A 
and B covered services to the individual within a set provider network.10 The 
HMO is also allowed to provide extra benefits, most notably drug coverage, 
reduced copayments for physician visits, dental benefits, and coverage for 
eyeglasses and durable medical equipment. In exchange for providing health care, 
the HMO receives a per-enrollee payment from CMS. In addition, the plan could 
charge a monthly premium to the enrollee.11 The offered premiums and benefits 
are subject to CMS approval. For instance, before the enactment of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) each Medicare HMO had to be an existing 
commercial HMO in the metropolitan area with a Medicare HMO enrollment 
capped at 50% of its total enrollment in the area. 
Each year from 1982 until 1997, CMS set the per-enrollee HMO payment 
at 95% of its projected Part A and B cost to treat a similar enrollee in the FFS 
program. The per-enrollee payment is the sum of a county/year-specific base 
payment and an increment based on age and gender and on institutional, 
Medicaid, and end-stage renal disease status. Until 1997, the projected base cost 
was the mean Medicare FFS claims for that county, for the period from eight to 
three years prior. 
The BBA and its subsequent modifications altered Medicare’s payment 
methodology. From 1998 onwards, the monthly base payment rate was set to the 
maximum of three figures: a blended input price (which mixes an adjusted 
national rate and an area-specific rate); a floor rate of $367; and a minimum rate 
increase of 2% per year. Subsequent legislation in the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act of 1999 increased the floor rate to $475 (and $525 for large urban 
counties) and added a 5% increase in the payments to previously underserved 
markets starting in 2000. Importantly, updates to the county payments remained 
unaffected by new Medicare FFS claims in the county, implying that the base 
payment rate continued not to be based on claims data in the county within the 
previous three years. Following these legislative changes, the  payment formula 
led to a substantial relative decrease in the payment rate for most counties. Most 
Medicare FFS enrollees (92%) also have supplemental insurance that offers 
benefits beyond Parts A and B. This supplemental insurance is either individually 
                                               
10 More precisely, for a given M+C contract, HMOs submit proposed service areas, which are 
clusters of counties in a given locale, to CMS for approval. 
11 Premiums were constrained to be non-negative during our sample period, although CMS started 
permitting negative premiums after our sample period.  
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purchased, provided by the government (through Medicaid, Veterans Affairs, or 
State Pharmaceutical Assistance) or by an employer. Often this coverage provides 
prescription drug benefits. Davis et al. (1999) report that of the non-M+C 
Medicare beneficiaries in 1995, 13% also had Medicaid (which provided drug 
coverage to 90% of this group), 35% had employer-sponsored Medigap insurance 
(86% with drug coverage), 31% purchased Medigap in the individual market 
(46% with drug coverage), 3% had other government-sponsored coverage (80% 
with drug coverage), and 9% had a mixture of coverage (80% with drug 
coverage). 
3. Model and inference 
We develop a simple model of health plan entry, benefit design, consumer choice, 
and mortality for the M+C market. We do not structurally estimate the model but 
rather use it to guide the development of estimating equations and the 
identification strategy. 
We consider a metropolitan area that is composed of counties c = 1,… ,C
and existing commercial HMOs j = 1,… ,J . Each year, each commercial HMO 
simultaneously decides in which counties, if any, to offer M+C plans. An HMO 
that offers an M+C plan would provide and be at-risk for the health care of any 
Medicare enrollee who chooses to enroll with it. Following the entry decision, 
each HMO must simultaneously decide on price and benefit structures for each 
county in which it operates in the M+C market. Let . p
jtc
. denote plan j’s price 
and b
jtc
its benefit design for time t and county c.12 Prices are constrained to be 
nonnegative. We focus on the binary benefit choice of whether or not drug 
coverage is provided. Let !d
jtc
 denote managed care plans with drug coverage and 
!n
jtc
.denote those without.  
There exists a set of Medicare enrollees in each county, i = 1… ,I . Let !
itc
denote health status, where a higher value of .!
itc
. indicates a higher probability 
of dying during the year. Each month, each enrollee observes the prices and 
benefits for each offered plan and then must make a discrete choice between one 
of the M+C plans offered in her county and the outside option, which is 
traditional FFS Medicare. We can write utility for any offered plan as: 
(1) u
ijtc
= f p
jtc
,!
itc
,b
jtc( ) + " ijtc , 
                                               
12 Plans may offer multiple products with different service offerings, but we do not model this.
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where f !( ) is some function and ! ijtc is an idiosyncratic unobservable. We 
normalize the outside option, FFS Medicare, to have utility u
i0tc
= !
i0tc
. Let 
h
itc
! 0,… ,J{ } denote the chosen health plan, which maximizes equation (1). 
Our choice model may result in adverse selection by enrollees. For 
instance, an enrollee in poor health (i.e., with a high !
itc
) may be likely to choose 
an HMO because she highly values the service offerings. Alternately, she may be 
unlikely to choose an HMO because she values access to a broad set of health 
care providers. One would expect enrollees in poor health to care more about drug 
coverage and hence be more likely to choose a plan with !d
jtc
= 1 than with 
!n
jtc
= 1 , all else being equal. 
The marginal cost to a plan for treating an enrollee depends on the 
enrollee’s health status and the plan’s benefits: 
(2) mc
ijtc
= g !
itc
,b
jtc( ) , 
for some function g !( ) . HMOs will likely compete by offering benefits which are 
both beneficial to enrollees and costly.13 Firms may endogenously choose 
benefits, price, and entry or exit to attract patients with a favorable cost profile, 
generating a second source of adverse selection. 
In addition to the marginal cost, HMOs face fixed costs for being in the 
M+C market in any year. We also allow for dynamic and spatial fixed cost 
variation: HMOs that were not in the M+C market in the previous year may incur 
a sunk cost of entry, HMOs that were in the market in the previous year and then 
exit may incur a sunk cost of exit (potentially negative), and HMOs that operate 
in more than one county may incur geographic spillover costs (generally 
negative).  
Each year, the Medicare administration sets a county/year reimbursement 
rate r
tc
. The gross benefit to the HMO is the reimbursement rate r
tc
times its 
number of enrollees. The reimbursement formula changed over time due to the 
BBA (and subsequent legislation), but never depended on FFS costs within the 
immediate three previous years or directly on the M+C plan’s cost history. Thus, 
we can express  
                                               
13 Town and Liu (2003) find that the provision of drug coverage by M+C plans generates 
significant consumer welfare. 
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(3) r
tc
= R
t
h
i!t!c
,mc
i0!t!c
1 ! i ! I ,!t ! t " 3,1 ! !c ! C( ) , 
for some formula R
t
!( ) . Firms will have some information, not necessarily 
perfect, about future reimbursement rates. 
Following the choice of plans, individuals will realize their illness state 
and obtain medical treatment that will either result in a cure for their illness or in 
death.14 Let m
itc
* denote a latent index for the likelihood of death (we explain 
below how m
itc
* translates into actual mortality). We let m
itc
* be a function of the 
individual’s health status and health coverage: 
(4) m
itc
*
= !
itc
+ "
d
!d
h
itc
tc
+ "
n
!n
h
itc
tc
, 
where !
d
and !
n
, the impacts of managed care with and without drug coverage 
relative to remaining in the Medicare FFS sector, are the key parameters of 
interest.15  
To estimate our model, we express an individual’s health status as a 
deviation from the county/year mean, by writing 
(5) !
itc
= "x
tc
+ #
tc
+ !!
itc
, 
where x
tc
are county/year mean observed health status measures, ! is a 
coefficient vector, !
tc
is a mean zero unobserved component of aggregate mean 
health status, and !!
itc
is a mean zero individual deviation from the aggregate 
health status. Rather than actual enrollment, we observe only county/time 
population mean enrollments by plan types, which we denote d
tc
and n
tc
respectively. Let e
itc
! !"
itc
+ #
d
!d
h
itc
tc
$ d
tc( ) + # n !nh
itc
tc
$ n
tc( ) . Then, we can rewrite 
equation (4) as 
(6) m
itc
*
= !x
tc
+ "
d
d
tc
+ "
n
n
tc
+ #
tc
+ e
itc
. 
                                               
14 Our model does not allow for dynamic treatment effects where an individual might survive but 
be more likely to die in a subsequent year based on the received treatment. We explored such 
specifications but the coefficients on lagged treatment were small and insignificant. 
15 We do not allow service offerings besides drug coverage and managed care to affect mortality. 
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We estimate equation (6) by aggregating from the individual level to the 
county/year level and using linear instrumental variables (IVs) weighted by the 
mean number of Medicare enrollees in the county. Note that the unobserved 
component of mortality in equation (6) includes both !!
itc
and the difference 
between the actual plan type and the population mean plan type.  
We estimate results from two different aggregation functional forms to 
examine the robustness of our results. For our first functional form, we let m
itc
*  be 
a latent illness index, with death occurring if and only if m
itc
*
> 0 , and we let e
itc
be distributed as a logit (i.e., as the difference between two Type 1 extreme value 
error terms). We further make the assumption that there are enough people within 
a county/year so that the sampling error in the Medicare mortality rate will be 
roughly zero. For comparison with the other functional form, let !
tc
" #
tc
for this 
specification. Following Berry (1994), a transformation of the aggregate mortality 
rate can then be expressed as a linear function of the regressors:  
(7) log
m
tc
1! m
tc
"
#$
%
&'
= (x
tc
+ )
d
d
tc
+ )
n
n
tc
+ *
tc
.  
For our second functional form, we let m
itc
* be the probability of death for 
person i and take the mean of equation (6) across individuals in the county. Let 
m
tc
denote the Medicare enrollee mortality rate, and let !
tc
" #
tc
+ e
itc
I
i=1
I
$ . We 
then obtain: 
(8) m
tc
= !x
tc
+ "
d
d
tc
+ "
n
n
tc
+ #
tc
.  
Regardless of the functional form, managed care enrollment rates may be 
endogenous. From equation (1), enrollees may choose plans with different service 
offerings on the basis of !
itc
and, in particular, !
tc
. This implies that !
tc
will be 
correlated with enrollees’ choices of plan, h
itc
, and through that with d
tc
and 
n
tc
.16 We control for the endogeneity using an instrumental variables approach, 
where functions of the payment rate are used as instruments for d
tc
and n
tc
. Our 
main identifying assumption is that the residual component of health status, !
tc
, is 
                                               
16 In contrast, because our data are all at the county/time level, using the mean enrollment patterns 
does not introduce any further endogeneity as the deviation from the mean will be uncorrelated 
with county/time mean information. 
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independent across time, specifically that !
tc
 is independent from any three-year-
old or older health shocks. The validity of this assumption depends on the quality 
of the aggregate health status variables x
tc
, which need to account for other time-
varying attributes that might affect elderly mortality. We include county fixed 
effects, detailed demographic information, mortality rates among younger people, 
and supplemental health coverage for the elderly. 
The model and identifying assumption imply that functions of r
tc
 are valid 
instruments for both d
tc
and n
tc
: functions of r
tc
will affect the set of available 
M+C plans, the benefit structure and premiums of the plans, and through that the 
share of consumers who choose drug and non-drug plans. In addition, r
tc
, and 
hence any function of r
tc
, is based only on variables three years old or older and 
will not be correlated with !
tc
. Moreover, the model implies that different 
functions of r
tc
 are jointly valid instruments for d
tc
 and n
tc
. The economic reason 
for this is that the entry and benefit decisions are nonlinear functions of r
tc
. 
Hence, d
tc
 and n
tc
 can each be expressed as a linear combination of multiple non-
collinear functions of r
tc
 plus a residual, where the functions can be indicators for 
r
tc
 being in different quantiles, for instance. As these multiple functions can all be 
excluded from the treatment equation (7) or (8) but all enter separately into the 
underlying selection equations determining d
tc
and n
tc
, they allow us to jointly 
identify the impacts of d
tc
 and n
tc
 on mortality. 
We illustrate the joint identification with a numerical example. Consider a 
simple data generating process with many similar counties which differ only in 
two exogenous dimensions: !
tc
and r
tc
. We let !
itc
= "
tc
, let !
tc
= ".1 half of the 
time and !
tc
= .1 the other half, and let r
tc
vary continuously with a distribution 
that is independent from !
tc
. We assume that each county contains one 
(monopolistic) HMO, plan 1, with no fixed or sunk costs or geographic spillovers. 
Each HMO knows !
tc
 and r
tc
 before deciding on entry. We also assume that there 
is no consumer selection based on !
itc
, that the price elasticity of demand is high 
enough that price is always zero, and that the idiosyncratic enrollee choice 
unobservables !
ijtc
 are distributed Type 1 extreme value. The f !( )  utility function 
from equation (1) will then be only a function of benefits b
1tc
. We let f !d
1tc( ) = 1 , 
f !n
1tc( ) = 0 , mci1tc ! tc ,!d1tc( ) = 1.1 ! tc + 1( ) , and mci1tc ! tc ,!n1tc( ) = ! tc + 1 so that drug 
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coverage increases both costs and utility, with a cost complementarity between 
drug coverage and illness severity. It is not necessary for us to specify the 
mortality process. 
By standard logit formulas, the HMO would capture 50% of the market 
share with a non-drug M+C plan, but 73.1% if it had a drug M+C plan. Per-capita 
profits will be ! !n
1tc( ) = .5 rjtc " # tc + 1( )( ) and ! !d1tc( ) = .731 rjtc " 1.1 # tc + 1( )( ) . 
Simple algebra then shows that when !
tc
= ".1 , the firm will enter with no drug 
coverage for .9 ! r
jtc
! 1.18 , with no entry below this range and drug entry above 
this range. When !
tc
= .1, the entry pattern is similar, but the comparable range 
for entry with no drug coverage is 1.1 ! r
jtc
! 1.45 . Thus, non-drug entry will 
occur with a mid-range r
tc
and drug entry with a high r
tc
, with the exact range 
depending on !
tc
.  
Because of the correlation between !
tc
and both d
tc
and n
tc
, OLS 
estimates of equation (7) with this data generating process would be inconsistent. 
However, we could consistently estimate (7) with instruments dˆ
tc
= r
jtc
> 1.3{ }
and nˆ
tc
= 1 ! r
jtc
! 1.3{ } , where !{ } denotes an indicator function, as these 
instruments will be non-collinear predictors of both d
tc
and n
tc
. Adding in other 
features of the model (e.g., multiple firms, consumer adverse selection) will make 
the relation between the reimbursement rate and drug or non-drug entry more 
complicated, but the same fundamental identification will apply. While the 
example uses two instruments for simplicity of exposition, one could add to the 
predictive power of the instruments by generating four instruments of indicators 
based on the cutoffs .9, 1.1, 1.18, and 1.45. Moreover, the dynamic and 
geographic cost complementarities in our model imply that we can add further 
predictive power by using future and past payment rates and payment rates from 
nearby counties as instruments. 
Our actual choice of instruments is complicated by the fact that costs vary 
significantly across counties, implying that a payment rate that is generous in one 
county is not generous in another. As county population is highly correlated with 
costs, we normalize the payment rate based on population by regressing the 
payment rate on four measures of population (county population, health services 
area population, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population, and county 
elderly population). We define the residual from this regression to be the 
“normalized payment rate,” rˆ
tc
. We then create ten instruments based on rˆ
tc
: the 
rate, its second, third, and fourth powers, its log and the square of its log, and four 
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dummies indicating its quintile (with one excluded). We also create three 
instruments that indicate the mean, minimum, and maximum normalized payment 
rates in the MSA, to capture the geographic cost complementarities noted above. 
To exploit the variation from sunk costs, we then include these same 13 
instruments for the previous and subsequent year,17 for a total of 39 instruments. 
Because there is a potential tradeoff between asymptotic efficiency (which 
dictates more instruments) and small sample bias (which dictates less),18 we also 
examined results with smaller sets of instruments. 
A potential statistical issue with using these instruments is that they are 
not strictly exogenous: though our model and assumptions imply that rˆ
tc
is 
uncorrelated with !
tc
they also imply that rˆ
tc
is correlated with !
t"3,c
and further 
lagged residuals. Since fixed-effects IV estimates are equivalent to estimates from 
a mean-differenced instrumental variables specification, the residual can be 
expressed as !
tc
" 1
T
!
tˆctˆ =1
T
# . In a short panel, there may be a correlation between 
rˆ
tc
and this residual due to the 1
T
!
tˆctˆ =1
T
" component of the residual. With a 
sufficiently long panel, shocks to !
tˆ "3,c
(for instance) will have little impact on 
1
T
!
tˆctˆ =1
T
" . Thus, the consistency of IV estimates with this type of instrument 
depends on asymptotics in time. 
With eight years of data, the asymptotic approximation is likely to be 
close to valid. Nonetheless, we develop a forward mean-differenced specification 
which provides consistent results without requiring a long panel. This 
specification transforms the estimating equation by subtracting the forward mean 
(from t ! 1 to T) for each variable instead of the overall mean, keeping the same 
untransformed instruments as in the base specification. Thus, the transformed 
residual is !
tc
" 1
T " t
!
tˆctˆ = t"1
T
# .19 The instrument rˆtc  will then not be correlated with 
the transformed residual since the residual does not include long-lagged terms 
such as !
t"3,c
. The transformation does result in a serial correlation in the 
residuals and thus we cluster our reported standard errors at the county level. 
                                               
17 We let the instrument be zero for years that are not in the sample. 
18 Different authors suggest different points along this tradeoff. For instance, for panel data with 
serial correlation, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using every available instrument while Keane 
and Runkle (1992) suggest a more limited set.  
19 For observations in year one, the difference goes back only to year one. 
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because prior to this year enrollment in Medicare HMOs was very small. We 
create a county-level panel data set of mortality rates and other county-specific 
information. The data come from six different sources, listed in Table 1, which we 
merge together.  
Table 1 
Data sources 
Data Set Source Variables 
Compressed Mortality File National Center for Health 
Statistics 
Mortality rates by age and 
cause of death 
State-County-Plan Penetration 
file and M+C/AAPCC 
Standardized Per Capita Rates 
of Payment 
Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 
M+C enrollments by HMO 
benefit structure and CMS 
payment data 
Medicaid Program Statistics Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 
Medicaid enrollments by age 
classification 
Area Resource File Area Resource File Population by race, per-capita 
income, number of MDs and 
hospitals. 
Population Estimates Program Bureau of the Census Predicted population by age 
and sex categories 
Medigap Premium AARP Medigap Premiums 
for Plan F 
First, the mortality data are constructed using the 1989–2004 Compressed 
Mortality Files (CMFs) from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). 
The CMFs contain death certificate information including the county of residence, 
year of death, age, gender, and diagnosed cause of death for all deaths in the 
United States.20 We use mortality from two diagnosed causes, heart disease and 
neoplasms (cancer), as well as all-cause mortality. In 1999, there was a change in 
the cause-of-death coding. To compare the cardiac and cancer mortality rates 
across coding systems, we multiplied the pre-1999 mortality rates by 
comparability ratios provided by the NCHS in the 1999–2004 CMF 
documentation. The data also include population estimates by county, gender, and 
five-year age groups. We calculate mortality rates by age group and cause by 
dividing the number of deaths in each group by the population measures by age 
                                               
20 We used these data following a data use agreement with the NCHS. 
4. Data 
Our study period is 1993 to 2000. We choose 1993 as the start of the sample 
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group. In a small number of cases (less than 0.05%), changes in county definitions 
resulted in missing mortality rates. 
Second, we merge the mortality data with county-level data from CMS on 
M+C plan enrollments, plan prescription drug benefits, total Medicare enrollment, 
and the M+C constant dollar payment rate. We define the drug benefit using the 
base plan as reported by CMS.21 Our data do not provide the specific limitations 
of the drug coverage and other available benefit information is prone to 
substantial reporting errors, and thus our measure of plan benefits is binary. This 
is a limitation, as it implies that we must lump different levels of drug coverage 
together.  
Third, we use information from CMS on the number of Medicaid enrollees 
by state and age category (65 to 74, 75 to 84, and 85 and older). We proxy for the 
county-level Medicaid penetration rate with the state-level rate. 
We gather demographic information from two sources. We use data on 
county per-capita income, population by age and race, number of practicing 
physicians, and number of hospitals from the Area Resource File. We use detailed 
demographic data from the Census Bureau’s Population Estimates Program to 
provide a more complete account of the entire age distribution of the elderly by 
county. These data provide annual county-level projections of the population in 
each year in each county by age and sex category. The age categories that we use 
are 64, 65, …, 84, and 85 and older. 
Finally, in some specifications we use Medigap premium data from the 
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), one of the largest sellers of 
Medigap policies. By regulation, Medigap plan benefits fall into 10 different 
categories, labeled A through J. We use the Plan F data because they included the 
most widely available data on Medicare FFS prices. We were able to obtain price 
data for 1993–99, but not for 2000. 
It is useful to characterize the M+C drug coverage since it is central to this 
paper. The structure of the benefit varies across three dimensions: generic drug 
copayments, branded drug copayments, and the total maximum drug expenditure 
covered by the plan. We have detailed information on the plan drug benefit 
structure only for 2000.  
In 2000, approximately 80% of the M+C plans offered drug coverage with 
a mean monthly premium of $34.85. Of the plans offering drug coverage, the 
mean copayment for generic prescription drugs is $7.80 (std. dev. = $2.93; 
median = $7), and the mean copayment for branded prescription drugs is $16.16 
                                               
21 This may lead to measurement error to the extent that HMOs offer multiple M+C plans in a 
county, some with drug coverage and some without. However, the 2000 Medicare Current 
Beneficiaries Survey reports that 17.8% of all M+C enrollees are enrolled in a plan without drug 
benefits. The corresponding figure in our data is 17.3%, suggesting that any measurement error is 
small.  
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(std. dev. = $6.12; median = $15). Of these plans, 89% cap the total annual 
enrollee expenditures on drugs, with 37% setting the cap at less than $1,000 per 
year, and another 37% setting caps of over $3,000 per year. 
Table 2 
Summary statistics  
Variable Entire sample 
Number of 
Observations 1993 2000 
Mortality rate, age 65+ (%) 5.06 (0.57) 25,014 5.01 (0.54) 5.14 (0.60) 
Mortality rate, age 65-74 (%) 2.51 (0.43) 25,014 2.60 (0.41) 2.40 (0.44) 
Mortality rate, age 75-84 (%) 5.76 (0.72) 25,014 5.93 (0.68) 5.65 (0.75) 
Mortality rate, age 55-64 (%) 1.07 (0.25) 25,014 1.15 (0.24) 0.99 (0.24) 
Heart disease mortality rate, 
age 65+ (%) 2.33 (0.36) 25,014 2.42 (0.36) 2.21 (0.34) 
Cancer mortality rate, age 65+ (%) 1.00 (0.16) 25,014 1.06 (0.14) 0.87 (0.13) 
MDs per capita (thousands) 2.40 (1.83) 25,112 2.20 (1.70) 2.51 (1.79) 
Hosp. beds per capita (thousands) 3.46 (2.40) 25,112 3.84 (2.54) 3.12 (2.22) 
Income (thousands of $) 24.9 (7.91) 25,112 20.7 (5.53) 29.5 (9.48) 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.41 (2.53) 25,112 7.02 (2.46) 4.20 (2.08) 
Total population (thousands) 900 (1,674) 25,115 877 (1,649) 944 (1,742) 
M+C drug penetration rate (%) 8.92 (13.7) 25,000 2.63 (6.87) 14.1 (16.4) 
M+C drug penetration = 0 (%) 45.1 (49.8) 25,000 68.4 (46.5) 33.5 (47.2) 
M+C non-drug penetration rate (%) 3.67 (7.74) 25,000 2.72 (5.94) 3.22 (7.78) 
M+C non-drug penetration = 0 (%) 59.1 (49.2) 25,000 57.8 (49.4) 71.6 (45.1) 
M+C monthly payment rate 
(2000 $) 454 (97.5) 24,998 409 (88.5) 487 (83.7) 
Medigap F premium (2000 $) 106 (23.0) 19,870 93.6 (15.1) —* 
Note: Each cell provides the mean value, weighted by the number of Medicare enrollees, with the 
standard deviation in parentheses.  
*Our Medigap data are from 1993–99 only. 
It is also useful to compare the prescription drug benefits to those offered 
through Medigap. Plans H through J offer drug coverage. All require a 50% 
coinsurance on prescription drugs with Plans H and I capping the annual 
prescription drug expenditure at $1,250 and Plan J capping it at $3,000.22 The cost 
                                               
22 Plans H and I differ in other small respects. Plan I covers Medicare Part B excess charges and 
at-home recovery expenses while Plan H does not. Plan J offers the same benefits as Plan I with 
the addition of covering Medicare Part B deductible and preventive care.  
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of enrolling in a Medigap policy varies across geography and insurers. For AARP, 
the mean (unweighted) monthly premium across states for ages 65 to 69 is 
$153.90 for Plan H, $156.57 for Plan I, and $192.57 for Plan J. Thus, M+C plans 
with drug benefits are significantly less expensive to Medicare enrollees than 
Medigap plans and, in general, they offer more generous coverage. 
Table 2 summarizes the major variables used in the study, weighted by the 
number of Medicare enrollees. The average elderly mortality rate was 5.06% 
during the sample period. Cancer and heart disease make up the biggest 
components of mortality, together accounting for about 60% of the average 
mortality rate. Mortality rates are rapidly increasing in age, ranging from 1.07% 
for ages 55 to 64 to 5.76% for ages 75 to 84.  
Table 3 
Changes in mortality and  changes in M+C enrollment 
from 1993 to 2000 (by 2000 payment) 
Quintile of 
2000 payment 
rate 
Percentage point 
change in total 
M+C enrollment 
Percentage point 
change in M+C  
non-drug enrollment 
Percentage point 
change in M+C 
drug enrollment 
Percentage point 
change in elderly 
mortality 
1 
[$218 – $381] 1.28% 0.81% 4.78% 0.07% 
2 
[$381 – $397] 2.74% 1.00% 1.74% 0.12% 
3 
[$397 – $426] 5.81% 2.24% 3.57% 0.17% 
4 
[$426 – $464] 8.11% 2.93% 5.19% 0.17% 
5 
[$464 – $772] 17.6% –0.83% 18.4% 0.12% 
Note: Each cell provides the mean percentage point change from 1993 to 2000 of the given 
variable when the 2000 M+C payment rate is in the specified quintile. All figures are weighted by 
the mean number of Medicare enrollees in the county. 
In 1993, the average M+C penetration rate across counties was 5.35%, a 
figure that increased to 17.3% by 2000. Medicare M+C payments were about 
$454 per month (in constant 2000 dollars), also rising over time. Drug penetration 
rates were always higher than non-drug penetration rates. There is substantial 
variation in the payment rate across counties—the standard deviation is 20% of 
the mean in 1993. Almost half of counties (45.1%) have no M+C plans with drug 
coverage, although by the end of the sample period this figure had dropped to 
33.5%. 
Table 3 provides some evidence on the relation between the 2000 M+C 
payment rate and the changes in M+C enrollment and elderly mortality rates over 
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the period 1993 to 2000. This table is meant to give an indication of the forces 
that will identify the estimates, as the fixed-effects IV estimator with one 
(endogenous) regressor would be the ratio of the coefficients of the differenced 
regressions of mortality on the instruments to the endogenous regressor on the 
instruments. The payment rate (the instrument) is broken into five quintiles. As  
we might expect, a higher payment rate is correlated with higher increases in the 
total M+C enrollment rate. The trend is most pronounced between the third and 
fifth quintiles of the rate. Breaking down the enrollment change into drug and 
non-drug enrollment, a movement from the fourth to the fifth quintile is 
associated with an increase in drug enrollment, but a decrease in non-drug 
enrollment. In other words, a moderately high payment rate in 1993 and 2000 was 
linked with a general increase in managed care enrollment, but a large increase in 
the payment rate was linked specifically with an increase in drug coverage and 
not with non-drug coverage.  
Turning to the elderly mortality rate, the third and fourth payment 
quintiles (those associated with the largest increases in non-drug HMO 
enrollment) show the largest increases in elderly mortality rates. In contrast, the 
fifth payment quintile (associated with the largest increase in drug HMO 
enrollment) shows no increase in elderly mortality rates. These results foreshadow 
our regression analysis findings and suggest that non-drug M+C plans, but not 
drug M+C plans, may increase elderly mortality.  
5. Results   
Parameter estimates and implied magnitudes 
Table 4 presents the main results of the paper, estimates of equations (7) and (8). 
We present eight specifications, which differ in the estimation methods, 
dependent variables, controls, and weighting. Specification 1 provides an OLS 
regression of the log model (7) of the impacts of M+C drug and non-drug 
coverage with only year dummies as controls, as a baseline comparison. In this 
and all other specifications, the omitted category is Medicare FFS. This 
specification shows that a higher M+C non-drug coverage is associated with a 
lower elderly mortality rate than Medicare FFS within a year, although without a 
statistically significant difference, and that M+C drug coverage is associated with 
a still lower elderly mortality rate, with a statistically significant difference from 
Medicare FFS. This regression is consistent with the idea that managed care and 
drug coverage both lower mortality, but is also consistent with a number of other 
hypotheses based on selection. 
Specification 2 adds in county and year fixed effects and the detailed 
demographic controls noted in the table. Unlike Specification 1, this specification 
shows that counties with an increase in non-drug managed care penetration had an 
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does not directly use any credible source of exogenous variation in the managed 
care penetration rate or in drug coverage. 
Table 4 
Estimates of the impact of M+C enrollment on mortality 
Dependent 
variable using 
65+ mortality 
M+C drug 
coverage 
(!
d
) 
M+C 
non-drug 
coverage 
(!
n
) 
log (55-64 
mortality 
rate) 
Estimation 
method N 
(1) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) –.26** (.034) 
–.055  
(.043) --- 
Weighted OLS 
with only year 
dummies 
24,936 
N
o 
IV
 
(2) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) .017 (.010) 
.040** 
(.012) 
.016** 
(.003) 
Weighted fixed 
effects  24,433 
B
as
e 
(3) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) .038 (.043) 
.299**  
(.068) 
.012** 
 (.003) 
Weighted forward 
mean-differenced 
fixed effects IV  
24,401 
(4) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) .021 (.040) 
.248**  
(.072) --- 
Weighted forward 
mean-differenced 
fixed effects IV  
24,678 
(5) m
tc
.001 
(.0019) 
.012** 
 (.0037) 
.059** 
(.014) 
Weighted forward 
mean-differenced 
fixed effects IV  
24,683 
(6) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) –.017 (.035) 
.255** 
(.089) 
.015** 
(.004) 
Weighted fixed 
effects IV  24,401 
R
ob
us
tn
es
s 
ch
ec
ks
 
(7) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) –.009 (.034) 
.214** 
 (.066) 
.014** 
(.003) 
Weighted forward 
mean-differenced 
fixed effects IV, 
Medigap 
19,426 
(8) log
m
tc
1!m
tc
( ) –.065 (0.091) 
.390** 
(.130) 
0.012 
(.003) 
Weighted forward 
mean-differenced 
fixed effects IV, 
fewer instruments 
24,432 
Note: All specifications include year fixed effects. Specifications 2 through 6 include as controls: 
percent of  elderly in Medicaid; percent of population age 65 and over; log per capita income; 
unemployment rate; MDs and hospital beds per capita; percent of white, black and Hispanic; five 
regional time trends; and the percent of elderly at each age/sex cell and county fixed effects. 
Specification 7 adds the log of the Medigap Plan F premium. All standard error calculations are 
clustered at the county level. The instrument set is specified in Section 3. Specification 8 uses only 
contemporaneous values of the instrument set – 5 total instruments.  
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
increase in mortality. While this specification does control for fixed effects, it 
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Specification 3 provides our base specification, and uses the fixed effects 
IV model with the instruments and forward-mean-differencing procedure detailed 
in Section 3. We estimate the impact of M+C drug coverage on elderly mortality 
to be very similar to Specification 2. However, we estimate the impact of M+C 
non-drug coverage to be much worse, with a coefficient that is about 7 times as 
large as in Specification 2. Thus, our main finding is that enrollment in M+C 
plans without drug coverage causes an increase in mortality but that M+C plans 
with drug coverage have no significant mortality impact, both relative to 
Medicare FFS.  
Using the coefficients from this specification, we find that moving a 
Medicare enrollee with the mean mortality rate of 5.06% from an M+C non-drug 
plan to an M+C drug plan would reduce the mortality rate by 1.41 percentage 
points; the weighted sample average change in mortality rate from this move is 
1.46 percentage points. Combining this information with the 34.3 million elderly 
Medicare enrollees in 2000 implies that each 1% move from an M+C non-drug 
plan to a drug plan would save about 5,000 lives. There are other plan attributes 
besides drug coverage that may be (positively or negatively) correlated with the 
drug benefit. These include the benefit offerings noted in Section 2 as well as the 
possibility of wider physician networks. We believe that these attributes are 
unlikely to have a mortality impact and hence that our estimated effect is due to 
drug coverage.23 
Evaluating the average economic value of M+C drug coverage is 
somewhat difficult, because it depends on the expected number of years and 
quality of the remaining life for each person under consideration for receiving 
drug treatment. However, we can give some plausible bounds to this value. 
Conservatively, we assume that the mortality gains from drug coverage are 
limited to only one extra year of life, we value only mortality gains and we use 
$75,000 as the net value of a life year (following Cutler and McClellan, 2001). 
This yields an average per-capita value of drug coverage of approximately 
$1,050. An upper bound calculation can be made by assuming that a death 
avoided returns a person to the mean health status and life expectancy of her age 
cohort. Using data on mortality probabilities and life expectancy from life tables 
for 2000 from the National Center for Health Statistics (Arias, 2002) and the same 
net value of a life year yields an average per-capita value of approximately 
$10,539.24 It is instructive to compare these values to the cost of drug coverage 
                                               
23 Importantly, very few M+C non-drug enrollees had drug coverage because alternative drug 
coverage generally duplicates M+C benefits. For instance, only 9% of M+C non-drug enrollees 
had drug coverage in 2000, according to the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.  
24 The implied benefit for the values of the coefficient is $5,477 at the 5th percentile and $16,078 
at the 95th percentile. 
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provision. The typical difference in the annual premiums between Medigap G and 
J plans (which are similar in benefits except that only J offers drug coverage) in 
2000 is about $760.25 Thus, even our conservative estimates suggest that drug 
coverage adds a substantial benefit over its cost.  
Understanding the relative mortality impact of Medicare FFS and M+C is 
more subtle. Due to data limitations, Medicare FFS enrollees with and without 
drug coverage are combined into one category. Davis et al. (1999) report that 63% 
of Medicare FFS enrollees had drug coverage in 1995. It is likely that Medicare 
FFS enrollees for whom drug coverage would lower the probability of mortality 
are more likely to obtain drug coverage than others, implying that 63% is a likely 
lower bound on FFS drug coverage for enrollees for whom drug coverage would 
lower mortality. The M+C drug coefficient can be interpreted as capturing both 
the effect of moving a group to HMOs and of moving some fraction of the group, 
likely less than 37%, to drug coverage. Thus, our coefficient estimates are 
consistent with the notion that HMOs have no overall mortality impact. 
Specifications 4 to 8 provide different robustness checks of the findings in 
Specification 3. Specification 4 drops the log mortality rate of middle-aged 
individuals, ages 55 to 64, as a regressor. This statistically significant control is 
potentially important because it will proxy for a variety of time-varying local 
attributes that can affect mortality and are potentially correlated with the 
instruments, such as shifting unobserved local demographic patterns or time-
varying local changes to practice style. We find that dropping this younger 
mortality rate results in estimated effects of M+C drug and non-drug coverage 
that are virtually unchanged from Specification 3. The implication is that while 
the middle-aged mortality rate in a county is an important predictor for the elderly 
mortality rate, the above effects for which it proxies are not correlated with the 
instruments, both conditional on all the other regressors. We believe that the 
stability of the results across these specifications also provides further evidence 
against other potential non-included regressors influencing our main estimated 
coefficients. 
Specification 5 uses the same controls and instruments as the base but with 
the linear model in equation (8) instead of the log model in equation (7). Although 
the coefficients are not directly comparable to those of the base because of the 
different dependent variable, we find the same relative impacts as in the base. In 
addition, the magnitudes are very similar, with a move from M+C non-drug to 
drug plans reducing the elderly mortality rate by 1.2 percentage points. We prefer 
using the log specification because it allows for the proportional scaling of factors 
such as the middle-aged mortality rate. 
Specification 6 reports results from the same specification as the base but 
                                               
25 Authors’ calculation using AARP data from California.  
using standard fixed effects IV instead of the forward mean differenced 
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-procedure. This procedure generates coefficients that imply a similar mortality 
impact from both the M+C drug and non-drug plans than in the base specification. 
This suggests that the bias from the short panel and instruments that are not 
strictly exogenous is small.  
Specification 7 is similar to the base but adds in a state-level proxy for the 
log Plan F Medigap premium. We obtain results that are very similar to the base. 
The Medigap coefficient, which we do not report in the table, is small and 
insignificant, with a t statistic of 1.60. This variable is likely not significant in part 
because it is a rough proxy of the availability of supplemental coverage and/or 
because there may be little demand elasticity to Medigap premiums among 
enrollees for whom drug coverage might affect mortality. We do not include the 
premium for our other specifications because of its lack of significance and the 
fact that the premium data are not available in every year and hence would lower 
the sample size. 
Table 5 
Estimates of the impact of M+C enrollment on mortality by age and disease 
M+C drug 
coverage ( !
d
. 
M+C non-drug  
coverage ( !
n
. 
log (55-64 
mortality rate) N 
(1) Mortality rate 
age 75+  
.053 
(.050) 
.275** 
(.071) 
.010* 
(.005) 
24,379 
(2) Mortality rate 
age 65–74 
.020 
(.046) 
.262** 
(.093) 
.021** 
(.005) 
24,356 
(3) Heart disease mortality 
rate age 65+ 
.166** 
(.048) 
.249**  
(0.068) 
.007** 
 (0.003) 
23,409 
(4) Cancer mortality rate 
age 65+ 
–.094* 
(.047) 
.109 
(.063) 
.004 
(.004) 
23,341 
Note: All estimation is performed using the forward mean-differenced fixed-effects IV estimator 
weighted by the mean number of Medicare enrollees in the county. All specifications include the 
following controls: percent of population in Medicaid for age range; percent of population age 65 
and over; log per capita income; unemployment rate; MDs and hospital beds per capita; percent 
white, black and Hispanic; five regional time trends; the percent of elderly at each age/sex cell; 
and year and county fixed effects. Specifications 3 and 4 include the heart disease and cancer 
mortality rates for age 55-64 as controls, respectively. All standard error calculations are 
clustered at the county level. Instrument set specified in Section 3. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
Specification 8 uses five instruments instead of the 39 in the base 
specification. Specifically, we use as instruments the contemporaneous county 
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payment rate and indicators for the relative payment quintile of the county (with 
one excluded). This specification also gives similar results to the base 
specification. 
Table 5 provides evidence on the impact of M+C drug and non-drug 
coverage on a number of different groups. All specifications use the fixed-effects 
IV forward mean-differenced method to control for endogenous selection into 
plan type. The specifications follow the base with some small deviations in the 
controls, noted in the table.  
Specifications 1 and 2 report the impact of M+C drug and non-drug 
coverage on mortality for the 65 to 74 and over-75 age groups, respectively. We 
find results that are similar to the base specification. For both age groups, the non-
drug M+C coefficients remain significant and large and the drug M+C 
coefficients remain small and insignificant.  
Specifications 3 and 4 estimate the impact of M+C drug and non-drug 
coverage on disease-specific elderly mortality rates. We choose the two diseases 
with the largest mortality for the elderly, cancer and heart disease. We find that 
M+C drug enrollment causes a significantly positive increase in the mortality rate 
for heart disease, with M+C non-drug enrollment causing an even larger impact. 
These results suggest that managed care causes worse outcomes for cardiac care, 
consistent with evidence that managed care provides less intensive cardiac care 
(see Chernew et al., 2002) and that intensive cardiac treatments have a beneficial 
impact on mortality (see Cutler, 2004). We also find that enrolling in a managed 
care plan with drug benefits reduces mortality rates for cancer. During our sample 
period, it is unlikely that intensive cancer treatments had substantial mortality 
impacts. However, anti-nausea drugs, which may contribute to survivorship by 
increasing the tolerance for chemotherapy, are mostly not covered by Medicare 
FFS.  
Specification tests 
The causal interpretation of our results above depends crucially on our 
assumption of exogenous instruments. Accordingly, we have performed a number 
of statistical tests of the validity and usefulness of our instruments, all using our 
base specification, as given in Table 4, Specification 3.  
First, we test the power of our instruments by performing first-stage 
regressions of the endogenous regressors d
tc
and n
tc
on the instruments and 
exogenous regressors, as suggested by Bound et al. (1995). As in the base 
specification, we use forward mean difference variables to allow for fixed effects. 
These tests show that the instruments are strong predictors. We can strongly reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments do not enter in these regressions, with 
F(36, 3081) = 23.81, p=.00 for d
tc
 and F(36, 3081) = 13.78, p =.00 for n
tc
, using 
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clustered residuals. The reason for this result is that the substantial within-county 
variation in the payment rates is driving M+C enrollment and drug benefits. We 
also jointly estimate the same two equations with a multivariate regression to test 
whether the coefficients on the instruments are the same across the two equations. 
The test strongly rejects the coefficients being the same with !2( 36 )  = 2,926, p = 
.00. This implies that the first-stage projections of d
tc
and n
tc
are significantly 
different from each other, which is necessary to jointly identify the effects of drug 
and non-drug managed care coverage.26 
Second, we provide evidence on the serial correlation of the residual 
health shocks !
tc
, since our main identifying assumption is a lack of correlation 
between !
t"3,c
and . Although this assumption is not directly testable, we can 
obtain some evidence by examining the correlation of the residual from a 
reduced-form regression of the dependent variable log mtc
1!m
tc
( ) on all exogenous 
variables, including the instruments and fixed effects. We estimate this reduced-
form regression specifying a within-county AR(1) process for the residual, and 
find an estimated correlation of ! = .082 , which implies that the estimated 
correlation after three years is !3 = .00055 . This does not seem consistent with a 
sizeable, positive serial correlation between !
t"3,c
 and !
tc
. 
Third, we test for the endogeneity of M+C drug and non-drug coverage, 
by performing a Wu (1973) – Hausman (1978) test of our base specification 
against a specification without instruments, as given in Table 4, Specification 2. 
We can reject the exogeneity of the M+C coverage rates, with F(2,3087) =18.24, 
p=.00.27 
Last, we perform the LM test of overidentifying restrictions created by the 
fact that we have 39 instruments but only two endogenous regressors (see Hansen, 
1982). We fail to reject the assumption that the instruments are exogenous, with 
!2( 37 )  = 44.4, p = .19. 
Explanation of our findings 
A likely explanation for our finding is that M+C drug coverage encourages the 
elderly to take life-extending prescription drugs by lowering the marginal cost of 
drugs. There is substantial support for this in the literature. Anecdotally, 
                                               
26 The test of the hypothesis that all of the coefficients are equal across the two equations is also 
soundly rejected.  
27 We use the specification of the Hausman-Wu-Durbin test outlined in Davidson and MacKinnon 
(2004) 
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by taking their drugs less frequently than prescribed (Lagnado, 1999). 
The literature provides data-driven supporting evidence for this 
explanation. In 1995, 86.6% of Medicare beneficiaries had a prescription filled 
(Adams et al., 2001). Several studies (Lillard et al., 1999, Davis et al., 1999, and 
Stuart and Grana, 1998) find a positive correlation between prescription insurance 
coverage and prescription drug usage in the elderly population. Poisal and Murray 
(2001) estimate that Medicare enrollees without drug coverage fill 2.4 fewer 
prescriptions than enrollees with drug coverage. Poisal and Chulis (2000) find 
that, among Medicare enrollees with three or more limitations to the activities of 
daily living, those without drug coverage use 43% less prescription drugs in dollar 
terms than the same population with prescription drug coverage. Using data from 
employer-based health coverage, Goldman et al. (2004) find that increased out-of-
pocket expenditures reduced the use of drugs for a variety of conditions. 
None of these studies attempts to control for unobserved selection into 
drug coverage or managed care. While these studies generally examine relatively 
small samples, without enough power to identify mortality differences, some 
recent studies (Lucarelli, 2006, and Yang et al., 2004) find that increased drug 
coverage reduces mortality among the elderly. 
It is also useful to compare our estimated magnitude of 5,000 lives saved 
from the 1% movement to drug coverage to the literature. We perform back-of-
the-envelope calculations for three common conditions for which data were 
available—high cholesterol, hypertension and diabetes—using the following 
formula: ! mortality = base mortality rate ! (% increase in mortality from 
condition) ! prevalence of condition in Medicare population ! % reduction in 
mortality from prescription drug use ! % reduction in prescription drug use from 
lack of insurance ! 1% ! size of Medicare population. We use a conservative 
base mortality rate of 3.5%. Adams et al. (2001) report that the absence of drug 
coverage reduces the use of hypertension drugs for individuals with high blood 
pressure by 23%. We use this estimate for all three conditions, as it appears to be 
roughly the median estimate from the sparse literature on compliance. 
Our estimates indicate a large impact of drug coverage among patients 
with high cholesterol. This condition is prevalent⎯50% of the elderly population 
has blood serum cholesterol levels in excess of 240 mg/dL (National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey III). Pekkanen et al. (1990) report that serum blood 
cholesterol in excess of 240 mg/dL increases mortality risk by 350% for the 
elderly while Shepherd et al. (1995) find that pharmaceutical treatment for high 
blood cholesterol reduces all-cause mortality by 22%. Combining the estimates 
yields a saving of 700 lives from drug coverage for high cholesterol enrollees. 
Performing similar calculations for hypertension and diabetes yield mortality 
physicians report that financially constrained patients “extend” their prescriptions 
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decreases of 240 and 330 lives, respectively.28 Since our back-of-the-envelope 
calculations of three common conditions result in an expected increase of 
approximately 1,260 lives, this suggests that our estimated value of 5,000 lives is 
plausible. 
Adverse selection and equilibrium provision of quality 
Our model implies the possibility of consumer selection into managed care plans 
based on their attributes. Our results from Table 4 suggest that there is in fact 
substantial adverse selection. In particular, a comparison of Specifications 1 and 3 
shows that even though mortality rates for M+C plans are substantially lower than 
for Medicare FFS, the causal effect of these plans is not to lower mortality rates. 
This shows that managed care plans are attracting a selection of patients who are 
less likely to die than the average Medicare FFS enrollee.29  
Comparing Specifications 2 and 3, we see that a substantial portion of the 
relative selection into non-drug plans is based on the unobserved severity of 
illness, !
tc
. In particular, an examination of the coefficients suggests that non-
drug M+C enrollees are in significantly better health than drug M+C enrollees, 
and that this adverse selection is based on different levels of the unobserved 
severity of illness, !
tc
. We verify this pattern by performing simple regressions 
using fitted values of !
tc
from the base specification. An over-65 population 
weighted regression of d
tc
 on !
tc
 and year dummies yielded a positive coefficient 
on !
tc
with a t-statistic of 2.50, while a similar regression of n
tc
on !
tc
yielded a 
negative coefficient with a t-statistic of –4.29.30  
Recall that our model has two potential sources of selection, enrollees and 
HMOs. The signs of the correlations noted above suggest that enrollees with high 
unobserved illness severity disproportionately select into plans offering drug 
coverage and those with low unobserved illness severity disproportionately select 
into non-drug plans, which is the demand response that we might expect. Any 
HMO response to unobserved illness severity is likely to be the opposite, as there 
is likely a complementarity between illness severity and the cost of prescription 
drug treatment. Thus, the results imply that any HMO response to unobserved 
illness severity is dominated by the consumer response. This is consistent with the 
fact that information about enrollee health shocks may take longer to filter to 
                                               
28 The inputs into the mortality formula for hypertension and diabetes are available from the 
authors upon request. 
29 Consistent with this, Town and Liu (2003) show that M+C enrollees have lower medical costs 
than Medicare FFS enrollees. 
30 Lustig (2009) estimates a structural model of adverse selection in the Medicare Advantage 
market. He also finds significant adverse selection into Medicare HMOs.  
24
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 2 (Advances), Art. 3
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/1/16 6:45 PM
firms than to the enrollees themselves and the fact that HMOs must make 
decisions annually, while enrollees can make decisions monthly.  
Although adverse selection was present in the market for M+C drug plans, 
it did not cause this market to collapse. For instance, 77% of M+C enrollees in 
our sample were enrolled in drug plans, a figure that was increasing over time. 
Moreover, in 2000, 78% of M+C enrollees in plans without drug coverage had at 
least one plan with drug coverage in their county. This contrasts with other 
situations where plans with generous benefits have gone into a death spiral and 
collapsed after the payer implemented a payment scheme where the generous 
plans were reimbursed at the same rate as the less generous plans, similar to M+C 
(see Cutler and Reber, 1998). The likely reasons why the M+C drug market did 
not collapse include the facts that the majority of plans capped the drug benefit to 
limit the adverse selection, that M+C plans attracted healthy elderly people on 
average (which compensated for the fact that drug plans attracted less healthy 
people than non-drug plans), and that in many counties the government 
reimbursement during our sample period was generous thereby overcoming 
incentives induced by adverse selection. 
In spite of the fact that the M+C market did not collapse, our results 
suggest that its equilibrium outcomes may not be optimal. Specifically, there is 
likely to be an under provision of HMOs offering drug coverage, since the value 
of these plans is high. There is some evidence that this is occurring in the 
Medicare HMO market. Among counties/years in our sample with an HMO 
present, 23.6% had no HMO that offered drug coverage. In addition, the literature 
has found that non-drug M+C plans offer more benefits than drug plans, and that 
these non-drug benefits are valued by enrollees.31 Given that these non-drug 
benefits and drug benefits are very unlikely to be substitutes, this suggests that the 
market may sometimes under provide attributes besides drug coverage. Last, 
though we do not model this, information problems may also cause further market 
failures. For instance, it is possible that some enrollees without drug coverage did 
not know that their drug coverage had been dropped. 
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of the Medicare HMO program and drug 
coverage on the elderly mortality rate using a fixed-effects IV estimator that is 
consistent with endogenous selection into managed care plans and drug coverage. 
                                               
31 Consistent with this explanation, McBride (1998) finds an inverted U-shape relationship 
between the payment rate and the provision of M+C non-drug benefits while Town and Liu (2003) 
find an inverse correlation between the value of M+C non-drug benefits offered by plans and the 
likelihood they offer drug benefits. 
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coverage has no significant impact relative to Medicare FFS coverage. This 
finding is robust across a variety of IV specifications and holds for different age 
groups of the elderly. The magnitudes of our findings are large but also consistent 
with the literature. Our findings suggest that the benefits of drug coverage are 
much greater than the cost. 
The likely explanation for our results is that drug benefits cause Medicare 
enrollees to use more drugs which extends their lives. While we do not have 
evidence on the potential impact of drug coverage for Medicare FFS patients, we 
believe it will be similar since the methods of service provision are similar across 
the two types of plans. Apart from their role in the provision of drug benefits, 
HMOs appear to have little effect on mortality, although there is weak evidence 
that their cancer treatment quality may be better than Medicare FFS but that their 
heart disease treatment quality may be worse than Medicare FFS.  
Our results suggest several policy implications. Most directly, they imply 
that policies to extend drug coverage to the elderly would decrease elderly 
mortality. Following our sample period, the introduction of Medicare Part D in 
2006 significantly expanded drug coverage to the elderly and our results implies 
that between 2005 and 2006 we should observe a significant drop in the elderly 
mortality relative to the non-Medicare population. Between 2005 and 2006, the 
mortality rate for the over-65 population dropped 3% (from .0486 to .0472) while 
the age 55 to 64 mortality rate declined only 2.2% (from .0091 to .0089). While 
this simple analysis cannot determine if the introduction of Medicare Part D 
caused the differential drop in mortality for the Medicare eligible population, the 
pattern is consistent with our results.   
In addition, our results imply that moving Medicare enrollees towards 
managed care plans is not likely to have any adverse mortality consequences. The 
passage of the 2003 MMA and 2010 PPACA is evidence that Congress made 
similar assessments. Our results also imply that there are substantial selection 
differences between Medicare HMOs and Medicare FFS and, in particular, that 
M+C non-drug plans tend to attract enrollees with a higher than average 
unobserved health status. The unobserved nature of the selection also suggests 
that any attempts by the Medicare administration to better adjust payments for 
observed patient risk status may not completely eliminate the adverse selection. 
However, reimbursement schemes that paid plans more to provide drug benefits 
to enrollees would alleviate this selection problem and potentially help the market 
function more efficiently. 
We find that enrollment in an HMO that does not provide drug benefits 
significantly increases mortality, while enrollment in an HMO offering drug 
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